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DR. ROBERT L. FINE. Professor Thomas Mayo is Jommg me today to talk about treatment 
for the dymg patient: medical ethics 
and the law. Tom is an associate pro-
fessor of law at Southern Methodist 
University and a scholar m health law 
and b10ethics. He also is an ad1unct 
professor m the Department of Inter-
nal Medicme at The University of 
Texas Southwestern Medical School 
Tom serves on numerous ethics com-
mittees m North Texas. He cochairs 
the ethics committee of Parkland Me-
morial Hospital and has served on our 
own ethics committee for years. He is 
a wise teacher and scholar and is well 
known for his expertise m health law 
and medical ethics. 
When Professor Mayo and I first 
discussed physician-assisted smcide 
and euthanasia as part of the spectrum 
Thomas w Mayo, JD of treatment alternatives for dymg pa-
tients, we did not know how timely 
the topic would become. Recently, the first 2 cases oflegally sanc-
tioned physician-assisted smcide were reported m Oregon Mean-
while, a rogue respiratory therapist at a California hospital 
confessed to killmg dozens of his patients whom he deemed to 
be deservmg of some type of active euthanasia Of course, Dr 
Jack Kevorkian has either killed or assisted m the deaths of> 100 
patients. 
I want to start by walkmg you through the poem titled "How 
Annandale Went Out" ( 1), written around the turn of the cen-
tury by the Pulitzer Pnze-wmnmg American poet Edwm Arlmg-
ton Robmson (1869-1935). Annandale is a character who 
appears m several of Robmson's wrinngs In this poem, the 
speaker, m fact, is a physician. 
They called it Annandale-and I was there 
To flourish, to fmd words, and to attend 
Liar, physician, hypocrite, and fnend, 
I watched him, and the sight was not so fair 
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As one or two that I have seen elsewhere 
An apparatus not for me to mend-
A wreck, with hell between him and the end, 
remamed of Annandale, and I was there 
I knew the rum as I knew the man, 
So put the two together, if you can, 
Remembenng the worst you know of me 
Now, view yourself as I was, on the spot-
W 1th a slight kmd of engme Do you see 7 
Like this You wouldn't hang me? I thought not 
In the first stanza, the physician is very honest about what 
we physicians sometimes are-sometimes liars, sometimes hypo-
crites, and sometimes fnends to our patients The physician is 
seemg a patient whom he refers to as an "it," as an "apparatus," 
as a "wreck," with hell between now and the death to come. 
Unlike Jack Kevorkian, this physician is saymg, "I knew this man 
when he was well, and I know what he is now" The physician's 
only weapon agamst Annandale's impendmg h~llish road to 
death is a "slight kmd of engme"-the cylmder and piston of a 
syrmge When we get to the end of the poem, the physician has 
euthanized or killed the patient 
I would like to put you on the spot and ask how many are 
willing to hang this physician for his act10ns? Perhaps hangmg 
is too strong a punishment. How many would at least condemn 
the physician and say that you are troubled with what he did? 
The mdecision about both the propriety and punishment, if only 
for the actions described m this poem, reflects our long-stand-
mg ambivalence about the alternative of active euthanasia for 
the dymg patient And yet, active euthanasia is only one alter-
native of several we shall explore. 
So, what, then, are the options for the dymg patient and the 
physician, nurse, or chaplam "on the spot" with the patient7 
Obv10usly, the first is contmued aggressive treatment-what I 
like to refer to as medical practice by technologic imperative: "I 
dialyze, therefore, I am." Medical practice by technologic impera-
tive follows the witticism, "To the person who owns a hammer, 
everything looks like a nail "You Just keep pushmg the technol-
ogy at the patient, even when it is no longer beneficial or con-
structive.-
Thankfully, I thmk m American medicme right now we 
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its to technology. As powerful and seemingly muaculous as it may 
often be, there comes a point where continuing aggressive treat-
ment is no longer in the best interest of the dying patient. We 
are relearning to practice with what I call the ethical and the 
spmtual imperative. We ask not only what can be done techni-
cally, but what should be done. By asking the question, we enter 
an ethical and even a spmtual dimension of healing, and we find 
that there are 4 basic opt10ns that are practiced in this country: 
passive euthanasia, induect euthanasia, physician-assisted sm-
cide, and active euthanasia. There remams considerable misun-
derstanding about these terms; the following are the standard 
defmitions denved from the ethics literature. 
Passive euthanasia is terminating or withholding life-sustain-
ing treatment, thereby allowing the patient to die This is the 
most traditional way that physicians allow patients to die. It dates 
back to the Hippocratic tradition 2500 years ago when those 
physicians recognized that there were times when everything was 
not possible in medicme, and it was time to withdraw treatment 
and let nature take its course If you realize that 80% of the deaths 
m America occur in health care institutions of some sort, most 
of them hospitals, and that 80% of those deaths are preceded by 
consctous dec1S1ons either to withhold or withdraw medical 
therapy, you realize how common passive euthanasia has become. 
The second opt10n is the practice of indirect euthanasia This 
is the administering of narcotics or other pharmaceuticals to 
relieve pain, dyspnea, nausea, or other symptoms of dying with 
the unintended or incidental consequence of death 
The thud option is physician-assisted suicide. This is the op-
tion that has been adopted in the state of Oregon Physician-
assisted smcide occurs when the physician provides medicat10ns 
or other intervent10ns with the understanding that the patient 
intends to use those medications to commit smcide In other 
words, it is not subtle; it 1s open and aboveboard. The doctor who 
prescnbes the medication knows exactly what is going to be done 
with it. Perhaps the strongest proponent of this is the oncolo-
gist Dr. Timothy Qmll. 
Finally, there is active euthanasia-intentionally administer-
ing medications or other mtervent10ns to cause the patient's 
death, which is what is going on in the Annandale poem. We 
know that active euthanasia is not Just practiced by fictional 
physicians but occurs, at least on occas10n, m real life as well. 
Passive euthanasia and induect euthanasia have become the 
standards of practice, for better or worse, in our country when it 
comes to acknowledging that a patient is going to die and de-
cidmg how that is going to occur. 
Despite this, there are obvious times when, at least in some 
people's minds, passive euthanasia and induect euthanasia are not 
optimal or best treatments Clearly, the citizens of the state of 
Oregon hold this belief. Interestingly, at least a couple of Junes 
who sat in Judgment over Dr Jack Kevorkian believe that pas-
sive and induect euthanasia are not optimal treatments and have 
refused to condemn him for engaging in active euthanasia 
We are going to explore the alternatives of physician-assisted 
smcide and active euthanasia in a little more depth. They are 
obv10usly not identical, but in both cases the physician intends 
to kill or aid in the killing of a patient who could otherwise be 
kept alive I will cover the ethical arguments about these, and 
Professor Mayo will cover some of the legal issues But fust, let 
me give you some of the histoncal background. 
The ethics of active euthanasia have been debated through-
out medical history. In Hippocratic times, active euthanasia was 
practiced in ancient Greece. The Hippocratic physicians who 
refused to give a "deadly potion" were actually taking a minor-
ity view Histoncally, this became the maJonty view of medicine, 
yet not without continuous debate. 
Str Thomas More (1478-1535) and Su Francis Bacon 
(1561-1626), to name only 2 important Western philosophers, 
believed that active euthanasia was appropnate for physioans to 
engage m. Similarly, about 4 centunes later m the USA, there 
was a bill m the Oh10 legislature to legalize active euthanasia. 
The bill was defeated, but the debate did occur To bnng us up-
to-date, m 1997 Oregon passed a bill that officially approved 
physician-assisted smcide. This bill resembles some of the rules 
that are m place in the Netherlands pertammg to active eutha-
nasia. 
The ethical arguments, either for or agamst physician-
assisted smcide and active euthanasia, center around autonomy, 
beneficence, intent and actwn, and public policy concerns. Autonomy 
is a key concern m our society It is the notion that each of us 
ought to be self-governing, we ought to have control over our-
selves Proponents of active euthanasia argue that the nght to 
self-governance is absolute and must include the ultimate au-
tonomous act of choosing when and how to die. Around the turn 
of the century, Eugene Debbs, the social philosopher and labor 
organizer, stated, "Human life is sacred, but only to the extent 
that it contnbutes to the JOY and happmess of the one possess-
mg 1t and to those about him, and 1t ought to be the pnvilege of 
every human being to cross the River Styx in the boat ofh1s own 
choosmg when further human agony cannot be Justified by the 
hope offuture health and happiness." (2) Opponents argue that 
not all voluntary acts are Justified by autonomy. John Stuart Mill 
said, "1t 1s not freedom to be able to alienate his freedom " (3) 
That is, autonomy does not grant one the freedom to give away 
that freedom Furthermore, as a society we limit many voluntary 
acts, including dueling or the voluntary selling of oneself into 
slavery. Opponents of unlimited autonomy suggest 1t 1s not ab-
solute, that we belong either to God or community 
Arguments about physician-assisted smcide also center on 
the concept of beneficence There 1s the idea that in the practice 
of med1cme we go to the house of the sick for the benefit of the 
sick. We are there to do good. Proponents of active euthanasia 
say that, in the face of unmitigated suffenng, the most benefi-
cent act is to kill the patient. A duty to practice beneficently, 
then, can become a duty to kill the suffenng patient 
As I have looked back through medtcal histones, perhaps 
the best example that I have found of the notion of beneficence 
fulfilled through killing is m the wntmgs of Dr. Adma Blady-
SzwaJgier m the Warsaw Children's Hospital Dr. SzwaJgier was 
a Viennese-trained pediatncian who completed her residency 
around 1939. She was picked up by the NaztS and confined to 
the Warsaw ghetto where she proceeded to establish and run the 
children's hospital. As you can imagine, they had very little 
medicine, and penodically Jews were taken out and sent to the 
killing camps. 
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Late m the war, the remammg Jews m the ghetto revolted 
agamst the Nazis and killed several German soldiers At that 
pomt, the Nazis came mto the ghetto and began shooting and 
executmg every Jewish person they could fmd. Dr Szwaigier had 
already seen German soldiers kill Jewish children by banging 
their heads agamst a wall m order to save bullets As the Nazis 
approached the hospital, she admmistered sedatives and pam 
killers she had hoarded and actively euthamzed the children on 
her wards She actually managed to survive but did not publish 
her memoir I Remember Nothing More until she was nearly 80 
years old (4). She clearly felt that the unmitigated suffering of 
her patients demanded somethmg that made her mtensely un-
comfortable, the killmg of her patients. On readmg her mem-
oir, I felt that she was actmg out of a sense of love for her patients, 
and that, m tellmg her story many years later, she was still show-
mg love for her patients 
Opponents of beneficence do not accept this argument. 
They say that the most beneficent act m the face of suffermg 1s, 
m fact, good palliative care The rare cases of unm1t1gated suf-
fering do not Justify changmg medtcme's historic rules They 
basically appeal back to the H1ppocrat1c trad1t1on of refusmg to 
give a deadly potion. 
Another ethical argument focuses on intent and action Pro-
ponents of active euthanasia and physician-assisted smcide ar-
gue that mtent and action are ummportant. They say that 1f 
passive euthanasia 1s acceptable, then active euthanasia also must 
be acceptable, because the end results that count are that the 
patient is dead and that the patient could not have been kept 
alive m either case These proponents go on to argue that 1t 1s 
d1smgenuous for those m support of only passive euthanasia or 
mduect euthanasia to say that they do not mtend for the patient 
to die when they withdraw treatment or engage m aggressive 
symptom control to the pomt of terminal sedation 
Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass1sted sm-
Cide state that the end results are not nearly as important mor-
ally as are mtent and action For example, m our society we draw 
a d1stmction between mvoluntary manslaughter and mtentional 
murder. In both of these cases, obviously the person has died, but 
the mtent was different. When we talk about passive euthana-
sia and physician-assisted smc1de, the mtent of passive euthanasia 
is said to be to relieve suffering by allowmg nature to take its 
course, not to kill the patient. The action engaged m is the with-
drawal of treatment that rs not really prolonging life so much as 
prolongmg dymg. Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1c1an-
assisted smc1de who favor passive and mdirect euthanasia argue 
that when they practice mdirect euthanasia, their mtent 1s to 
relieve suffermg by the act of g1vmg only enough medication to 
relieve that suffermg. I can guarantee you that a lot of you who 
have stood at the bedside of a dymg patient, nurses m particular 
man mtens1ve care umt settmg, have wrestled with this, thmk-
mg, "Well, I've got this order for morphme. How much can I give 
to relieve suffering and yet not engage actively m killmg my 
patient7" It does put nurses, particularly, man awkward spot 
Fmally, there are the public policy debates about euthanasia 
Proponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-ass-1sted smc1de 
argue that euthanasia happens already but man unregulated fash-
ion There are certam polls suggesting that physicians do, on rare 
occasions, engage m this process I know that members of the 
Dallas medical commumty have, because we have discussed 1t 
privately. Proponents argue that it 1s bad for society to erect false 
barriers to a practice that 1s tolerated or endorsed by so many 
members of the soCiety 
Furthermore, proponents of active euthanasia and physician-
assisted smc1de state that by makmg these act1v1ties legally avail-
able, patients will be protected by careful regulation of the 
practice. This 1s one of the arguments made m Oregon that I 
thmk helped carry that statute through the legislature. They go 
on to state that patients who might refuse to embark upon cer-
tam aggressive treatments for fear of bemg trapped by the treat-
ment would now know that they have this legal right to engage 
m active euthanasia or phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de. Moreover, they 
would have the ability to end their lives qmckly and easily 1f 
thmgs did not turn out the way they wanted. Proponents argue 
that 1f active euthanasia or phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de were legally 
available, 1t would empower patients to accept more aggressive 
treatments than they currently accept 
Opponents obviously disagree with everythmg that I have 
Just said Basically, the public policy opposltlon to active eutha-
nasia and phys1cian-ass1sted smcide falls mto what may be called 
the slippery slope factor That ts, 1f you go over the edge Just a 
little bit, you are gomg to slide right down the mountam. In 1920, 
Hoche and Bmdmg published The Permission to Kill Life Unwor-
thy of Life ("lebens unwertes Leben") (5). Itwas widely subscribed 
to by most of orgamzed German med1cme, and rt convinced the 
maJority of German phys1c1ans that there were some human 
condmons that were so bad, the suffermg was so horrible, the 
disease was so d1sf1gurmg, or 1t caused the patient to be so far 
beneath what was considered to be human, that 1t was okay to 
kill the patient I German physicians and nurses actually murdered 
several hundred thousand retarded, deformed, demented, and 
chromcally 111 Aryan c1t1zens before they began ktllmg Jews who 
were seen as socially defective. 
Opponents of phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de and active eutha-
nasia who look at the Dutch experience fmd little hope that the 
Dutch will behave better than the Germans The Netherlands 
has tolerated active euthanasia, the mtentional admimstrat10n 
of a drug by the physician to kill patients, for qmte a few years 
now as long as physicians followed certam safeguards. The safe-
guards are that the patient has to request active euthanasia re-
peatedly, the patient has to have unmitigated suffermg that 
cannot be relieved by any other means, and there has to be a 
second opm1on that agrees with the act. 
To fmd out how well this was bemg practiced, the Dutch 
government set up a comm1ss10n under their attorney general, 
Remelmk (6). This comm1ss10n conducted a prospective study 
by 405 Dutch physicians who reviewed 5197 deaths. They 
showed that, on average, there were about 9000 requests for ac-
tive euthanasia per year m the Netherlands, with about one third 
of those actually occurring. That 1s, two thirds of the requests 
did not lead to an active ktllmg of the patient. The 3000 cases 
of active euthanasia a year came to 1.8% of all deaths m the 
Netherlands Opponents of active euthanasia and phys1cian-
ass1sted smc1de note that m 40% of the Dutch cases, at least 1 
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phys1c1ans had discussed active euthanasia at least once, and 54% 
had part1e1pated m 1t 
What would these numbers look like 1f extrapolated to the 
Umted States? Look around this room and 1magme that >80% 
of you would have discussed active euthanasia with your patients 
and >50% would have engaged m 1t at least once. There would 
be about 150,000 requests for active euthanasia a year, with 
50,000 actual cases occurnng, and, 1f we were not any better than 
the Dutch at followmg the gmdelmes, there would be 20,000 
violations of the proposed safeguards 
THOMAS W. MAYO. Obviously, the debate over phys1cian-
ass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia has moved out of medical 
school grand rounds and medical Journal settmgs and has become 
a matter of public debate, public leg1slat1on, and public contro-
versy. The public d1mens1on of this debate has not always been 
As long as basic respect for the patient's choices is 
observed, terminating life~sustaining care to the 
point of terminal sedation does not raise a criminal 
or civil legal issue in any state. 
respectful of the kmds of d1stmctions that Bob has carefully laid 
out this mornmg It has not always been the most well mformed 
of debates, but 1t has, nonetheless, certamly begun with some 
vigor, and 1s not about to get turned around or stopped. I will 
discuss the form m which some of these public developments 
have occurred m order to see where the law leaves us on this 
question m 1998 
First, let us start with public opm1on. It 1s often said that two 
thirds of Amencans support phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de, and 1t 1s 
often said that two thirds of Amencans oppose phys1e1an-ass1sted 
smc1de It turns out that both of these propositions are correct 
It all depends on the question that 1s bemg asked and how the 
chmces are framed. 
A more careful review of public opm1on pollmg data shows 
that roughly one third of Amencans are agamst phys1c1an-
ass1sted smc1de, no matter how one descnbes 1t, and regardless 
of what kmds of safeguards are suggested by way of lim1tmg this 
type of euthanasia Another one third of Amencans are m fa-
vor of phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de as a general proposition and are 
really qmte supportive of 1t. 
Then there 1s a fmal one third m the middle who are mostly 
agamst phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de but who agree that 1t probably 
does have some role as a treatment option m certam extreme 
circumstances This middle group, dependmg on how the ques-
tion gets phrased, flips to one side or the other of a yes-or-no 
chmce when the pollmg 1s done. 
Let us examme where the states have come out legislatively 
with regard to these different types of euthanasia Both passive 
euthanasia and mdirect euthanasia ( the so-called "double-effect" 
death) are legal m all 50 states As long as basic respect for the 
patient's chmces 1s observed, termmatmg life-sustammg care to 
the pomt of termmal sedat10n does not raise a cnmmal or civil 
legal issue m any state Similarly, the Amencan Medical Assa-
c1ation has been pretty mfluential m the public debate, has been 
very active m litigation at the US Supreme Court, and has lob-
bied state and federal legislators extensively The Amencan 
Medical Assoc1at1on's pos1t10n 1s that termmatmg life support 
and termmal sedation (or double-effect death) are consistent 
with its ethical canons. 
Phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de, on the other hand, 1s illegal nght 
now m 48 states, all but Oregon, whose statute we will discuss 
later, and Massachusetts, which has no statute law on the sub-
Ject In addition to 48 states, the D1stnct of Columbia has banned 
phys1c1an-ass1sted smc1de. The Amencan Medical Association 
has taken a posltlon consistently over the years that phys1cian-
ass1sted smc1de 1s not permitted under its eth1eal canons S1m1-
larly, at the far end of the spectrum, active euthanasia 1s also not 
permitted by the Amencan Medical Assoc1at10n's ethical gmde-
lines and would be considered some form of hom1e1de m all 50 
states as thmgs currently stand. That 1s the background for what 
has become a very mterestmg legal battle m the courts over the 
status of proh1b1t10ns by the states agamst phys1c1an-ass1sted sm-
e1de. 
To grasp this debate fully, however, 1t 1s important to remem-
ber a couple of thmgs about lmgation m the US Supreme Court 
on these matters. The very first so-called nght-to-d1e case decided 
by the Supreme Court only m 1990 was the case of Cruzan vs 
Director, Missouri Department of Health (497 US 261 [1990]). This 
case mvolved a young woman, Nancy Beth Cruzan, who, at the 
time of the commencement of litigat10n, had been m a persis-
tent vegetative state for about 5 years. By the time the case went 
before the Supreme Court, she had been in a vegetative state for 
nearly 8 years She was m a state facility, and the physicians who 
worked at that facility opposed the request of her parents that 
tube feedmgs be d1scontmued. 
In the state courts, Cruzan vs Director, Missouri Department 
of Health, ended up bemg litigated all the way to the M1ssoun 
Supreme Court. That court imposed a number of qmte severe 
limitations on the nght of parents or other surrogate dec1S1on-
makers to choose to d1scontmue hfe-sustammg treatments m the 
cases of patients who are unable to speak and choose for them-
selves The limitations mvoked consisted of ev1dentiary and 
burden-of-proof rules. The court said that dec1s1on-makers had 
to show that patients themselves had md1cated that they pre-
ferred not to have aggressive hfe-sustammg treatment. Further, 
this proof had to be shown with clear and convmcmg evidence, 
the highest standard of e1v1l proof at tnal. M1ssoun 1s not the only 
state that has adopted this pos1t10n. New York, hke a number of 
other states, 1s m hne with M1ssoun 
The rulmg of the M1ssoun Supreme Court raised a s1gmf1-
cant issue: Were some types of severe hm1tat10ns perm1ss1ble on 
a patient's chmce (although, m this case, Nancy Beth Cruzan's 
parents-not the patient-were makmg the dec1S1on) or were 
these hm1tat10ns gomg too far m hm1tmg chmces at the end of 
hfe? This issue was litigated up to the US Supreme Court 
The US Supreme Court was asked to decide whether the US 
Constitution prevents states from 1mposmg severe procedural 
ev1dentiary hm1tat1ons on family members' end-of-hfe chmces 
The Supreme Court ruled that there ts nothmg m the US Con-
stitution that says states cannot impose these fairly extreme 
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measures. It said that, although there may be some outer consti-
tutional pnnciple that might come mto play m a different sort 
of case, passive euthanasia is pnmanly a matter of state law, and 
the states have an extremely free hand and very broad authonty 
to develop their own rules m this area 
In additton, m a senes of opmions m this case, the Court 
expressed an almost wistful desire for the mcreased use of ad-
vanced directives, i e., hvmg wills or durable powers of attorney 
for health care Had there been an advanced directive, Cruzan 
potentially would have been qmte a different case, and the fail-
ure to respect the advanced directive executed by the patient 
might well have raised a more acute constitut10nal question for 
the Court There is certamly a suggestton m the opmions of 8 of 
the 9 Justices that Cruzan could have come out the other way 
had there been a hvmg will or a durable power of attorney for 
health care Moreover, even on the issue of whether state law or 
federal law governs m this area, the Supreme Court decision was 
a 5 to 4 declSlon The Supreme Court was extremely spht even 
over this fairly straightforward propositton. 
Just this last term, the Supreme Court had an occasion to 
consider the legahty of prohibitions agamst physician-assisted 
smcide m the cases of Washington vs Glucksburg ( 117 S. Ct 2303 
[1997]),mWashmgtonState,andVaccovs Qwll(ll7S Ct 2293 
[1997]), m New York Tim Qmll, a named plamtiff m one of these 
cases, is one of the most articulate proponents of the position that 
physician-assisted smcide ought to be regarded as an ethical op-
tton In both of these cases, groups of physicians and patients 
challenged state laws that prohibited physician-assisted smcide 
across the board In both of these cases, mtermediate federal ap-
pellate courts, the 9th Circmt and the 2nd C1rcmt, ruled that the 
prohibittons were unconstituttonal. This meant that, as a matter 
of either substantive due process under the 14th amendment or 
equal protection under the 14th amendment, prohibit10ns hke 
those m Washmgton and New York were unconstituttonal and 
had to fall. 
The impact of these decisions was potentially qmte strong, 
because the 9th Circmt embraces 9 states, or the entire western 
part of the USA. The 2nd Circmt embraces New York, Connecti-
cut, and Vermont When you add up the populations of these 2 
ctrcmts, about one third of the population of the USA hves m 
states that are covered by the rulmgs of these 2 mtermediate 
appellate courts It looked as though all of the laws prohibitmg 
physician-assisted sutcide m these states, at least, were uncon-
stitutional if these decisions were allowed to stand. Obviously, 
the Supreme Court would have some mterest m cleanng up the 
law m an area that would affect one third of the population of 
the USA So, the Court granted review m these cases and handed 
down its opmions last spnng 
The ftrst part of their holdmg is probably the most impor-
tant Just as it did m the Cruzan case, the Court said that states 
have a wide area of discretion to legislate m accordance with 
their view of pceferred public policy. This authonty mcludes the 
authonty to prohibit physician-assisted smcide, as Washmgton 
and New York have done and as Texas did about 2 decades ago. 
Consequently, the rulmg here is that neither the due process 
clause nor the equal protection clause of the US Constitution 
hmits state choice m this area, at least if the ch01ce is to pro-
hibit physician-assisted smcide. 
Other portions of the opmion are worth notmg. In one pas-
sage, the Supreme Court tned to draw a distmction between 
passive euthanasia and physician-assisted smcide The argument 
had been made that, given the mvolvement of medical person-
nel m producmg the death of a patient, physician-assisted sm-
etde and passive euthanasia ought to be viewed as roughly the 
same thmg The Court said no, that really is not true as a matter 
of Amencan law. The Court used both causation and mtent to 
try to show this Fust, the mtent with passive euthanasia is to 
reheve suffenng, not pnmanly to produce the patient's death, 
although it may be understood with mdirect euthanasia or 
double-effect that death is a foreseeable but umntended side ef-
fect of palliative care The mtent, however, is to reheve suffer-
mg only and not to achieve death as a means of domg that. In 
the Court's view, the causative agent with physician-assisted sui-
cide is a lethal dose of painkiller, whereas the causative agent with 
indirect euthanasia or double effect is a therapeutic dose of painkiller 
that was carefully calibrated and delivered to the patient with 
the mtentton and design to reheve pam only but turned out to 
be a dose that was enough to produce the patient's death Agam, 
proponents of physician-assisted smcide see these distmctions as 
dancmg on the head of a pm rather than really makmg an im-
portant distmctton, but the Court, a number of the litigants be-
fore the Court, and many people m the Umted States see these 
distmctions as bemg absolutely crucial 
What is the status oflaw m Oregon? In 1994, Oregon passed 
the Death With Digmty Act that provided for physician assis-
tance to the extent of wntmg a prescnptton for a dose of medi-
cation that will be used to end the patient's hfe. The voters, by 
about a 60% to 40% margm last November, reaffirmed their 
desire to have this statute on the books ( Oregon Revised Statutes, 
§§ 127 800-.897 [1997]). We have now seen the begmnmg of 
the implementation of that act m Oregon It is important, I 
thmk, to understand the safeguards that Oregon has tned to 
design mto this statute. 
Fust, the most important limitation may well be that only 
competent patients, i.e., adult patients with decision-makmg 
\ 
capacity, may participate m this exchange with physicians Mi-
nors are excluded, as are any adult patients who lack deciston-
makmg capacity. 
Second, this act is limited to patients who have a termmal 
disease. Although termmal disease is not defmed any more pre-
cisely than it is under the Natural Death Act m Texas, it has to 
be determmed m accordance with reasonable medical Judgment, 
and it has to be certified by 2 physicians, specifically, the attend-
mg physician and a consultmg physician who has expertise m a 
relevant area of medicme 
Next, the patient's request has to be repeated over a fairly 
long penod of time and has to be repeated, not once, not twice, 
but 3 times There are 2 oral requests that the statute antteipates, 
as well as a wntten one. I will descnbe those m more detail. 
Ftrst, there 1s a 15-day waitmg penod after the patient's ftrst 
oral request and before there can be a wntten request. Fifteen 
days is also the mmimum time between the first oral request and 
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ttent, as well as family members and those who are providing care 
for the patient, an opportumty to work through what 1t ts that 
has moved the patient to make this request at this time. This 
request may be a call for help, an indication of the failure, so far, 
to deal with the pain that he or she 1s feeling, or an attempt to 
deal with the loss of d1gmty that he or she 1s expenencing. Fur-
thermore, over these 15 days, tf there ts a way to try to meet some 
of these ob1ect10ns to the kmd of care the patient 1s receiving, 
obviously thts ts the time to do 1t. Second, there 1s a mtmmum 
2-day waiting penod between the wntten request and the wnt-
ten prescnption So, the whole process ts intended to be slowed 
down by at least 1 7 days This ts not enough of a slowdown 1f 
one 1s an opponent of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutc1de. Actually, this 
17-day cooling-off penod 1s a point of contention with some pro-
ponents of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutctde, as well, who think this 
wamng penod 1s really a demal of the due process nghts of pa-
tients. 
The last couple of safeguards consist of the followmg: Phy-
sicians must ask tf they can notify the patient's nearest relatives 
of the chmce that ts being made If the patient says no, the phy-
s1C1an may not deny the prescnptton to the patient on thts ba-
sis, but 1t at least has to be discussed. In add1t1on, before wnting 
the prescnptton, the physician must offer the patient the oppor-
tumty to rescmd the chmce. This must be exphctt and qmte af-
firmatively presented as an option 
There also has to be a very detailed informed consent dis-
closure session with the patient The statute 1s qmte speC1fic and 
goes on for about a page, which ts much longer than most in-
formed consent statutes. All of the things that need to be dis-
closed with the patient are descnbed, including alternatives to 
the use of the drug that the patient has requested, a detailed 
descnpt1on of what will happen 1f these drugs are taken in the 
prescnbed dose, and so forth. There 1s no blmkmg here m the 
statute about what ts bemg discussed and what 1s bemg done All 
of that has to be laid out with some care by the physician 
In add1t10n, tf the physician has a reasonable behef that the 
patient may be suffermg from some kmd of psychological or psy-
ch1atnc condmon, e.g., depression, 1t 1s mandatory for the phy-
sician to order a psychiatnc consult. There has to be some 
attempt at counseling the patient before the rest of the statute 
can be played out 
We will see how long any of these safeguards actually sur-
vive over the next few years m the ht1g10us environment of 
Oregon Frankly, I thmk that there are qmte respectable due 
process and equal protection arguments that might be made 
agamst one or more of the safeguards that have been set out m 
the statute If that 1s the case, then obviously the class of patients 
potentially affected, as well as the class of physicians who will 
be brought mto this, will expand as these hm1tat1ons drop away. 
Frequently over the years, I have heard Bob and a number 
of other folks on ethics committees around the ctty talk about 
choosmg the least bad death-deaths that are not that great no 
matter what choice ts made. Therefore, f1gurmg out what ts the 
least bad death, m terms of a patient's own system of values and 
goals for treatment, ts very often all we are left with for d1scus-
s10n purposes It could well be argued that the policy chmce that 
ts bemg made now or that was made, 1f you will, by the Supreme 
Court last year, 1s a chmce among the least bad alternatives m 
dealmg with phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de and active euthanasia 
My colleague Martha Mmow, who ts at the Harvard Law 
School, has recently wntten a review of the Supreme Court cases 
from last year that I have 1ust discussed (7) As she puts tt, there 
are really 2 big hes we have to choose between In this sense, 
these are the 2 least bad chmces that we are being asked to make 
The first of these hes ts that proh1b1t10n will effectively prevent 
the occurrence of phys1c1an-ass1sted sutc1de. The fact ts, even m 
a state where 1t 1s clearly a felony to engage m this act, as tt 1s in 
most of the states m this country, the polls published m JAMA 
and the New England Journal of Medicine, among other places, 
indicate that there ts considerably more acttvtty m this area than 
1s normally publicly acknowledged. Proh1b1tion may chill people's 
enthusiasm for 1t, prohib1t10n may d1mm1sh the numbers who are 
wtllmg to engage m the activity, but 1t 1s pretty clear that proh1-
b1t1on will not prevent phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de any more than 
proh1b1t1on statutes have ever prevented enttrely the act they 
address 
The second he Professor Mmow alludes to m her article 1s 
the he that the legahzatton of phys1cian-ass1sted smc1de would 
not systematically and routinely be used to push dying people 
mto death. She 1s not talkmg necessanly about the "shppery 
slope" here I thmk what she 1s talkmg about ts that the legal-
1zat10n of phys1cian-ass1sted smctde many legal system, whether 
tt 1s the legal system of Texas, or Cahforma, or the USA as a 
whole, changes the terms and cond1t1ons of the care that ts pro-
vided at the end of hfe, and that affects everybody. She puts 1t 
this way: "Exits change what tt means to be here The nght to 
termmate treatment makes contmumg treatment a daily chmce 
The nght to termmate a pregnancy makes contmumg the preg-
nancy a deliberate act The nght to divorce makes mamtammg 
a marnage a matter of vohtton. The nght to the atd of a doctor 
m endmg one's hfe means that dymg patients will be mv1ted to 
thmk about tts exercise It means that family members will con-
sider 1t. It means that hospitals and nursmg homes will mstitu-
ttonahze it. It means that popular culture will elaborate lt. It 
means that young and vibrant people will contemplate tt." Her 
pos1t10n 1s that the Supreme Court, although 1t did not articu-
late these 2 pos1t10ns as 2 hes to choose between, in fact, did 
choose one of these when tt said that proh1bmons agamst phy-
s1cian-ass1sted smctde are constttuttonal. The pubhc pohcy 
chmce that we are lookmg at over the next 5 to 15 years m ev-
ery state m the country wtll be which of these positions ts the 
least unappealmg to those who are m a pos1t1on to make the 
chmce 
DR. FINE: I want to wrap up with what, I hope, are some 
pragmatic truths about bemg on the spot with the dymg patient 
I am gomg to draw on a very mce article wntten by Dr. Andrew 
B1llmgs and Dr Susan Block ( 8) They outlme for us a compre-
hensive assessment of the dymg patient that takes in account not 
only the physical symptoms such as pain, nausea, weakness, and 
dyspnea, but also social, psychological, and spmtual factors 
Untreated pam 1s a common precursor to sutC1de attempts in our 
society. We know from the Dutch expenence that when pain was 
the reason why Dutch ctttzens were requestmg active euthana-
sia and 1t was effectively treated, the request for active euthana-
-
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sta was withdrawn. Unfortunately we have a long way to go The 
SUPPORT study in this country revealed that half of dymg pa-
tients expenence poorly treated pain near death (9) In my own 
expenence working as your ethics consultant here, I frequently 
fmd that patients and the1r families doubt our ab1hty to treat pam 
and other symptoms of dying They think that we cannot do 1t! 
Sometimes, this causes them to seek early termmation of treat-
ment If we can reassure patients that their pam can be managed, 
that their symptoms can be taken care of, many will choose to 
contmue hfe-sustainmg treatment and have a chance to get bet-
ter. I thmk 1t ts important that we reassure our patients of both 
the availability and our ability to treat then pain and other symp-
toms. 
We also must assess and deal with the psychological issues 
of dymg, includmg gnef, depress10n, and anxiety. This 1s easter 
said than done Obviously, one of the biggest problems we face 
ts that many of the vegetative symptoms of depress10n-mala1se, 
fatigue, and so on-are the symptoms of innumerable termmal 
illnesses Sometimes the only way you, as a physician, are gomg 
to know 1f a patient ts suffermg with depression ts to consult with 
a psychiatnst or psychologist. Often, we must try empmc treat-
ment with antidepressants to determme 1f the vegetative symp-
toms w1ll 1mprove. 
Dealing with spmtual and values issues 1s also important 
The old adage that there are no atheists m foxholes rmgs true 
for dymg patients as well. Amencan society ts a religious soo-
ety Consider askmg the FICA questions of your patients Do you 
have a rehg1ous or spmtualfarth? What is the involvement of that 
faith in your life 7 Do you have a religious or spmtual community 7 
How do you want to me to address your religious or sptntual con-
cerns? Only by askmg these questions do you have a chance to 
deal with them. Your patients and then families will often gmde 
you through this process m their spmtual hfe 1f you give them a 
chance At Baylor Umvers1ty Medical Center, we are fortunate 
to have the additional expertise of skilled hospital chaplams. 
Frequently, we must assess and deal with difficulties m in-
terpersonal relationships. As health care professionals, we are all 
fam1har with dysfunct10nal families, and the dysfunctional may 
only get worse m the face of termmal illness Termmal illnesses 
sometimes brmg out the best within fam1hes, but they also may 
bring out some pretty unusual and difficult copmg mechamsms 
withm families. We need to recogmze these and try to deal with 
them as best as we can. Agam, I thmk this is where a multi-
d1soplmary team approach comes m, with soCLal workers and 
chaplams becoming important adjuncts to the overall treatment 
effort 
Fmally, I would hke for you to reflect with me on the na-
ture of the phys1c1an-pat1ent relationship. The Jewish philoso-
pher Martm Buber suggests to us m his most famous work, I and 
Thou, that there are 2 fundamental relat10nsh1ps (10). One is 
the "I-it" relat1onsh1p. When we see patients in an l-1t relation-
ship, we come to view them as 1ust ob1ects to be mampulated m 
the environment. When we talk man l-1t relanonsh1p, we of-
ten go back to those techmcal questions that are drummed mto 
our heads m trammg, and the conversation often is somethmg 
hke, "Can you tell me what the potassmm, the blood gas, and 
the complete blood count are on the pneumoma m bed 12 7" The 
mformation ts necessary, but it is not sufficient for the best man-
agement of the dymg patient This conversat10n reflects the loss 
of the umque humamty of the person with pneumoma 
Buber suggests that a more appropnate relationship ts an"!-
thou" relationship It is a relationship of coequals based upon 
mutual respect, mutual trust, and even mutual need. I thmk that 
m order to create an I-thou relationship m the chmcal settmg 
of the dymg patient, the physician has to be w1llmg to have a 
different kmd of conversation that, I am afraid, does not hap-
pen as often as it should. Often, when I go m the role of ethics 
consultant m an effort to work through some perceived problem 
or cnsis around a dymg patient, one of the quest10ns that I will 
ask the patient is somethmg along the lmes of, "I know it's d1ff1-
cult to talk about this, but would you hke to talk about the sen-
ousness of your illness and even the possibility of death 7" Most 
When we finally accept that death is not our worst 
enemy, we can begin to see death as a healing of 
sorts. Death is, after all, inevitable and inescapable. 
patients say yes Almost mev1tably, the response I get from pa-
tients is, "Why, Dr. Fme, nobody has ever asked me that before." 
This md1cates to me that none of the doctors and none of the 
nurses have asked the patient that before. I will ask 1f 1t bothers 
him or her that I have asked. Almost all welcome the discussion, 
which then leads to quest10ns such as, "Where do you want to 
be when you die?", "Who should be there?",,or "In your worst 
moments, have you wLShed your death might come sooner 7" This 
begms to open up the relat1onsh1p with the patient and moves 
it beyond the l-1t techmcal necessmes (e g, knowmg the potas-
smm, the blood gas, and the complete blood count). The rela-
tionship becomes a more spmtual and lovmg I-thou that 1s 
essential to the highest quality ofhealmgl 
Remember that there is more than one type of healing. 
When we finally accept that death 1s not our worst enemy, we 
can begm to see death as a healmg of sorts Death 1s, after all, 
mevitable and inescapable. 
On that note, I want to end with a httle tale that Victor 
Frankl wrote of in Man's Search for Meaning (11). VICtor Frankl 
recalled a Persian folk tale involving a wealthy man and his ser-
vant They are walking through the garden of the wealthy man, 
and the servant is walkmg ahead Suddenly, the servant comes 
upon the figure of Death. Startled and fnghtened out of his wits, 
the servant turns and runs as fast as he can the other way and 
gets back to his master. He says, "Master, I have Just seen Death 
m the garden, and he has come to take me. Please, I have been 
such a faithful servant, may I have your fastest horse so that I 
might escape and run away 7" The master says, "Certainly you 
may. Take my fastest horse and flee to Teheran at once." And so 
the servant does. The master contmues walking through the 
garden, and he, too, comes upon Death, but, bemg a very brave 
man and, frankly, a httle bit angry at this point, he looks Death 
nght in the eye He confronts Death, and he says, "Death, why 
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you no wrong. Surely, it is not his time to die." To this, Death 
replies, "I did not mean to scare him so. I was only surpnsed to 
fmd him here m the garden today when I planned to meet him 
m Teheran tonight " 
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